Welcome, China Watchers. This week’s guest host is Retired U.S. Navy Adm. James Stavridis, who served as NATO’s 16th Supreme Allied Commander and 12th dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He's now an operating executive at The Carlyle Group, where he focuses on geopolitical risk and strategy. He spent about half his operational career in the Pacific and holds a PhD in international law with a focus on the law of the sea. He is a NYT bestselling author who has published 10 books and is chief international security and diplomacy analyst for NBC news. Over to you, admiral. — John Yearwood, global news editor
It has long been a platitude of military planning and national security that the U.S. should at all costs “avoid a land war in Asia.” The phrase has been variously attributed to World War II Generals Douglas MacArthur and Bernard Montgomery, and more recently was quoted by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in a speech at West Point.
No land wars in Asia — got it. But what about a war at sea? Unfortunately, the possibility of a sea-air battle between the U.S. and China is rising, and my recent book, “2034: A Novel of the Next World War,” lays out a plausible case of how it could begin, where the failure to control the ladder of escalation could occur, and how the outcomes might look. To really understand the possibilities requires looking factually at the importance of the South China Sea, the military balance in East Asia between the U.S. and China, and the important role Taiwan may play in the scenario.
The size and importance of the South China Sea is hard to overstate. It is larger than the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea combined. What is remarkable is that China claims this enormous chunk of real estate as “territorial seas,” out to a so-called “nine-dash line” they show on Chinese-produced maps. Normal territorial seas are 12 nautical miles — the Chinese claims stretch over a thousand miles. This is a preposterous assertion that has been soundly rejected by international courts. Allowing it to stand would open the door to many other frivolous territorial claims around the world.
Across all that sea surface passes more than 35 percent of the world’s shipping, around $5 trillion worth, including vital natural resources inbound for China (which has very little of its own gas and oil). Analysts see it as the first leg of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” a mercantile and geopolitical strategy designed to move resources to China and export manufactured goods as well as expand economic links and geopolitical influence. The South China Sea also hosts more than 10 percent of the world’s fish stocks and billions of barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas under its placid surface.
Its geography makes it essential for Beijing. The sea is China’s “front porch,” linking the Middle Kingdom to its immediate neighbors, and allowing them to put pressure on the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, among others. By claiming the South China Sea as territorial waters, Beijing theoretically has the right to control the passage of merchant traffic, restrict the presence of warships and harvest the natural resources as it wills. To back up this claim, they are building artificial islands across the region that support airfields, missiles, radars and logistic bases.
The U.S. Navy doesn’t call them “artificial islands.” It thinks of them as unsinkable aircraft carriers, and that’s how China would use them against the United States in a conflict. After the islands are constructed, they are then surrounded by large flotillas of fishing ships and Chinese coast guard vessels. Next, they’re turned into hardened military installations with radars, airstrips and defensive systems.
All of which helps explains the Chinese push to build the largest and most technologically advanced Navy in the world, with a powerful land-and-sea-based air force. China has today more battle force warships than the United States, roughly 360 to 300. Ours are assuredly larger by tonnage, far more capable in terms of both offense and defense, better connected through advanced command and control networks, and manned by better trained and more experienced crews.
But quantity has a quality all its own, as the saying goes. And in a South China Sea battle scenario, China would be fighting a sea-air war close to its shores — allowing easy access to logistics, ammunition, repairs and, above all, land-based air cover. The U.S., by contrast, would have long supply lines and have to get damaged ships and wounded crew members back to the U.S., or at least to allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia.
Which brings up another important point in this balance of power that is more favorable to the United States: our network of allies, partners and friends is far more capable. In addition to the three Pacific allies noted above, the U.S. has additional formal treaty alliances with New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand; very strong partnerships with Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia; and a growing friendship with India and other regional nations. Whether at this point we could count on them for military assistance in the event of conflict is questionable, but over time both their capabilities and attitudes could shift if Beijing continues its aggressive behavior and claims over crucial waters.
And all of those Indo-Pacific relationships are enhanced by U.S. ties with other nations whose navies are capable of global deployments to the Pacific. The U.K., France and Germany have all expressed willingness to participate in “freedom of navigation” patrols with the U.S. in the South China Sea. The U.K. just deployed its brand-new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, to Asia, accompanied by destroyers, frigates, a nuclear submarine and auxiliary ships. Of note, a U.S. guided missile destroyer will sail with the British strike group, which will also include a Dutch frigate.
So how might a sea war with China actually start? A Taiwan scenario is what most analysts foresee as the most dangerous potential scenario that could pull the U.S. and China into a conflict. Indeed, the outgoing commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific command, Adm. Phil Davidson, recently testified in an open hearing that he could foresee a Chinese move to invade Taiwan coming “in the next six years.” His concerns are not academic: Davidson is arguably the best informed U.S. defense official on China, reads all the top-level salient intelligence and has ultimate responsibility for any U.S. response.
Ultimately, the military balance of power in the South China Sea — and really throughout East Asia — will turn on technology. China is working very hard on 21st century warfighting systems that may count more than ship numbers or alliance structures, as important as both of those elements are to this challenge. Their efforts include a strong focus on cyber (both offensive and defensive tools), space and interconnected command-and-control systems for precision targeting; and unmanned vehicles in the air, on the sea surface, and even at depth under the ocean’s surface supporting their submarines. Add to that special forces like a “maritime militia” that can harass other nation’s shipping and provide real-time human intelligence while appearing to be noncombatants; missile defense to defend their network of artificial islands and coastal bases; hypersonic cruise missiles; diesel submarine quieting; and — to tie it all together — artificial intelligence.
Clearly the U.S. hopes to deter China from simply absorbing the entire South China Sea, and also wants Taiwan to remain a democratic state. Are we prepared to move beyond deterrence to actual combat in fulfilling those worthy goals? That is precisely the question being pondered in Beijing today. From the perspective of Washington, the lessons of history tell us that appeasing an aggressive nation doesn’t tend to work out well, and will lead to more demands and domination. These are bad choices, and this is a battle we don’t want, but it may be thrust upon us in the not-too-distant future.
On balance, at this moment in time, I’d still give a narrow edge to U.S. forces in a sea-air battle. Our technology, network of allies and bases in the region, long-range air, unmanned vehicles, and space capabilities still overmatch China. But Beijing is gaining rapidly, and by the end of the decade — if not sooner — will be in a position to truly challenge the U.S. in the South China Sea. We may not have until 2034 to prepare for this battle — it may come much sooner.
And now, back to your regular China Watcher programming ...
— A tech update from Protocol | China. Protocol | China, backed by Robert Allbritton, publisher of Protocol and POLITICO, tracks the intersection of technology and policy in the world's largest country. Sign up for the newsletter and learn more about Protocol’s research here. This week’s coverage includes a look at how China’s data privacy protections could soon surpass America’s, why every Chinese tech company suddenly wants to make electric vehicles, and a Q&A with a Chinese tech CEO about whether AI should have a personality and even political opinions of its own.
— BUSINESS BLUES: The head of the American Chamber of Commerce in China said that U.S. businesses suffer at the local level in China when friction between the two countries escalates, Bloomberg reported.
“We feel that local officials are reacting to the levels of tension in the relationship and just taking the safer path, which is to offer preference to domestic industry,” AmCham China Chair Greg Gilligan told a briefing Tuesday to launch an annual white paper.
AmCham China said in the paper that both nations should reduce their “unhelpful rhetoric” and reopen lines of communication.
Some in China had been optimistic that the relationship with the U.S. would improve under President Joe Biden, but the administration is expected to preserve limits on U.S. investments in certain Chinese companies imposed under former President Donald Trump, Bloomberg reported.
— BOOSTING BIRTHS FACES HURDLES: The New York Times reported this week that slowly, in fits and starts, China’s ruling Communist Party is loosening its long-held restrictions over childbirth and women’s bodies. Some local governments have tacitly allowed couples to have more than two children. Beijing has said civil servants will no longer be fired for such infringements. Party leaders have pledged to make population policies more inclusive, a signal that some have taken to mean the rules will be eased further.
The loosening comes as a growing number of voices in China, including lawmakers, scholars and officials, have urged the government to abolish birth restrictions, the Times said.
The party needs to take more aggressive action if it wants to reverse a precipitous decline in birthrates. A once-a-decade population census, released on Tuesday, showed that the number of births last year fell to the lowest level since the Mao era. Low fertility translates to fewer workers and weaker demand, which could stunt growth in the world’s second-largest economy, the Times reported. More here.
— ALL CLEAR FOR XIAOMI: The U.S. government will no longer blacklist Chinese smartphone maker Xiaomi, lifting a short and contentious ban on Americans investing in the company that was introduced by the Trump administration, CNN reported.
The U.S. Department of Defense and Xiaomi reached an agreement to set aside the ban on Tuesday, according to a U.S. court filing. The "parties have agreed upon a path forward that would resolve this litigation without the need for contested briefing," the filing said.
Xiaomi, the world's third largest smartphone maker, did not comment on the development, but sent CNN Business a copy of the court document.
Days before Biden took office in January, the Department of Defense added Xiaomi to a list of companies it claimed were linked to the Chinese military. Businesses on the list are subject to harsh restrictions, including the American investment ban, according to CNN.
— ENVOY SHUFFLE: The Wall Street Journal reports that Beijing is considering replacing Vice Premier Liu He as its top economic envoy with Washington, a decision that Biden administration officials say will indicate the depth of China’s interest in economic cooperation.
Under this scenario, according to officials with knowledge of the matter, Liu, who has spent decades working on economic issues, would be succeeded by Hu Chunhua, a younger vice premier who made his mark overseeing the restive Tibet region and running the trade-reliant coastal province of Guangdong but who has little experience in U.S.-China relations, according to the Journal.
The deliberation is part of a wider personnel shuffle as China recalibrates its approach to the new U.S. administration.
— SPLASHY RETURN: China Watcher reported last week about some nervousness over the return to Earth of China’s Long March 5B rocket, which had been tumbling out of control. We’re happy to report that it all went, well, fine.
The rocket’s fragments plunged into the Indian Ocean with no casualties, the South China Morning Post reported.
But the newspaper said the rocket’s fall to Earth focused attention on China’s forays into space — against the inevitable backdrop of broader tussles with the West.
As the rocket was reentering the Earth’s atmosphere on Sunday, NASA said China had failed to “meet responsible standards,” before China hit back, saying the operation was conducted within international law.
China announced that the “great majority” of the debris had burned up before it reached the Indian Ocean near the Maldives — confirming its earlier prediction that it was unlikely to cause any harm, the SCMP said.
POWER OF VACCINES: China is gaining more allies through its vaccine diplomacy. Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández said the Central American nation, a long-standing diplomatic ally of Taiwan, could open a trade office in China in a bid to acquire coronavirus vaccines, Reuters reported.
Honduras does not have formal relations with China and is one of a group of Latin American nations with strong diplomatic ties to Taiwan, which Beijing considers part of its territory.
Hernandez, frustrated rich countries have "hoarded" global vaccine supplies, said poorer countries desperately need vaccines and his government was willing to do whatever was necessary to help its people during a global pandemic, Reuters reported.
Several countries in Latin America are receiving Chinese vaccines from China. However, nations that have built ties with Taipei over Beijing, such as Honduras and Guatemala, are not in line to receive them.
HUNGARY PLAYS SPOILER: German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas on Monday lambasted Hungary for an “absolutely incomprehensible” decision to block an EU statement accusing Beijing of cracking down on democracy in Hong Kong.
POLITICO reported that EU foreign ministers have been unable to adopt the text even though diplomats said it had already been watered down to get Hungary’s backing. EU foreign policy decisions require unanimity to pass.
The meeting was the second in recent weeks at which foreign ministers failed to adopt conclusions on Hong Kong due to Budapest’s opposition.
“I think everybody can work out for themselves where the reasons are — because there are good relations between China and Hungary,” Maas said, referring to close economic and diplomatic ties between Beijing and Budapest, which is a member of China’s 17+1 business and investment initiative.
TALK BACK
KUDOS: "Today's China Watcher analysis by Geoffrey Garrett was one of the most interesting views on U.S.-China relations that I've read in recent months. Thank you."
— Len Lazarick, Maryland
ELECTRIC VEHICLES: "I love the newsletter, as always. One minor bit of feedback: it's a bit disingenuous to put in a bit of praise for China leading the world in electric vehicles without also noting that they're largely charged with electricity generated from China's ongoing construction of many new-antique coal power plants every year."
— Paul Legato, California
HELPFUL: "Kudos to Politico's China Watch for bringing in Dean Garrett as a guest columnist this week. His insights on the obstacles facing the Biden administration in rallying allies to support the U.S.efforts to rein in China were clear and helpful. Your weekly newsletter is always a highly anticipated missive. Thanks for your good work!"
— Ted Maloney, Washington
NOT THE SAME: "I read your newsletters regularly, and I am grateful for the words you publish. As an editorial matter, would it be possible to speak about the CCP, and not China, when referring to the government there? I have to work hard at reminding myself that the two are not at all the same: the CCP is not China, and China undoubtedly is not the CCP, much less the Politburo, or those padding about Zhongnanhai."
— Peter Petite, New York
Thanks to: Editor John Yearwood, Ben Pauker, Luiza Ch. Savage and Matt Kaminski.
Do you have tips? Chinese-language stories we might have missed? Would you like to contribute to China Watcher or comment on this week's items? Email us at [email protected].
May 13, 2021 at 07:31PM
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It's not too soon to prepare for a sea war in Asia - Politico
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